On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income in Optimal Social Insurance

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JACOBS, Bas, Dirk SCHINDLER, 2012. On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income in Optimal Social Insurance

@techreport{Jacobs2012Desir-30305, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income in Optimal Social Insurance}, year={2012}, number={2012-02}, author={Jacobs, Bas and Schindler, Dirk} }

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