Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

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HEINRICH, Timo, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

@techreport{Heinrich2012Strat-30257, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note}, year={2012}, number={2012‐11}, author={Heinrich, Timo and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/30257"> <dc:contributor>Heinrich, Timo</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30257"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:creator>Heinrich, Timo</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Aggregate behavior in two-player hide-and-seek games deviates systematically from the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of assigning all actions equal probabilities (Rubinstein and Tversky, 1993, Rubinstein et al., 1996, Rubinstein, 1999). As Crawford and Iriberri (2007) point out, this deviation can be explained by strategic level-k reasoning. Here we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, it is non-equilibrium beliefs that lead to the behaviour observed in the earlier studies: when a player's opponent is forced to play the equilibrium strategy, the player's choices are uniformly spread over the action space. At the same time, we find robust evidence of an unexpected framing effect.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-13T09:37:22Z</dc:date> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-03-13T09:37:22Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note</dcterms:title> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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