The impact of management incentives in intergroup contests
| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| Author: | Eisenkopf, Gerald |
| Year of publication: | 2014 |
| Published in: | European Economic Review ; 67 (2014). - pp. 42-61. - ISSN 0014-2921. - eISSN 1873-572X |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.003 |
| Summary: |
In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment. The results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only. However, group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures.
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| JEL Classification: | C72; C92; D72; D74; M12 |
| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Keywords: | Communication; Experiment; Rent-seeking; Management compensation; Group decision making |
| Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2014. The impact of management incentives in intergroup contests. In: European Economic Review. 67, pp. 42-61. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.003
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