Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN?

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LEAHY, Brian, 2013. Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN?. In: Philosophia. 41(1), pp. 221-238. ISSN 0048-3893. eISSN 1574-9274. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11406-012-9374-5

@article{Leahy2013Teleo-30067, title={Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN?}, year={2013}, doi={10.1007/s11406-012-9374-5}, number={1}, volume={41}, issn={0048-3893}, journal={Philosophia}, pages={221--238}, author={Leahy, Brian} }

terms-of-use Leahy, Brian 2015-02-25T15:23:03Z 2013 eng 2015-02-25T15:23:03Z Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN? Leahy, Brian Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that the conjunction of contemporary evolutionary theory (E) with the claim that there is no God (N) cannot be rationally accepted. Where R is the claim that our cognitive faculties are reliable, the argument is:<br />1. The probability of R given N and E is low or inscrutable.<br />2. Anyone who sees (1) and accepts (N&E) has a defeater for R, and this defeater cannot be defeated or deflected.<br />3. Anyone who has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for R has an<br />undefeated, undeflected defeater for everything she believes.<br />4. Therefore she has an undefeated, undeflected defeater for (N&E).<br />Plantinga (2011) defends the second premise. It examines and rejects several candidate defeater defeaters and defeater deflectors. One candidate is Millikan’s teleosemantics. I show that Plantinga’s motives for rejecting teleosemantics as a defeater deflector are inadequate. I then show that teleosemantics is not on its own an adequate defeater deflector. Then I offer an additional premise that constitutes a defeater deflector in conjunction with teleosemantics.

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