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Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany

Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany

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MARTENSEN, Finn, 2014. Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany

@techreport{Martensen2014Oppos-30045, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany}, year={2014}, number={2014-15}, author={Martensen, Finn} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/30045"> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Why do firms and workers bargain individually or collectively? I test the effect of product market competition and rents with German establishment data. Against intuition, competition and rents have opposite effects. Competition has a u-shaped effect on the probability of collective bargaining. This contradicts the existing theory (Ebell and Haefke 2006; Boeri and Burda 2009). By contrast, firms with higher rents are more prone to collective bargaining. For both competition and rents, the effect is stronger for sector-level than for firm-level collective bargaining. Indicators of higher productivity also matter: A higher export share drives firms into individual wage bargaining, while a higher share of workers with higher education drives firms into firm-level bargaining. Thus, the interplay between productivity, competition, and the wage setting regime is much more subtle than suggested by the existing theory.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:creator>Martensen, Finn</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-25T10:31:02Z</dc:date> <dcterms:title>Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30045"/> <dc:contributor>Martensen, Finn</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-25T10:31:02Z</dcterms:available> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Dateiabrufe seit 25.02.2015 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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