Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination

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REUTER, Tim, 2013. Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination

@techreport{Reuter2013Endog-29961, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination}, year={2013}, number={2013-09}, author={Reuter, Tim} }

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