Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation
| Type of Publication: | Working Paper/Technical Report |
| URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-274364 |
| Author: | Eisenkopf, Gerald; Fischbacher, Urs |
| Year of publication: | 2012 |
| Series: | Working Paper Series / Department of Economics ; 2012‐19 |
| Summary: |
People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance we disentangle reward motives in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of investor and delegate, we find that the trustee’s rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who ultimately decides gets a higher reward. Unlike studies on the punishment of delegated unkind decisions our results do not reveal sophisticated reward behavior that takes the responsibility of people into account.
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| JEL Classification: | C91; D63 |
| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Keywords: | Delegation, trust, reciprocity, intentions, experiment |
| Link to License: | Terms of use |
| Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2012. Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation
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