Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2013. Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Princ-29933, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments}, year={2013}, number={2013-07}, author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/29933"> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-20T09:42:50Z</dc:date> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29933"/> <dc:creator>Teyssier, Sabrina</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-20T09:42:50Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Teyssier, Sabrina</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Eisenkopf, Gerald</dc:creator> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Social preferences explain competitive behavior between agents and reciprocity towards a principal but there is no insight into the interaction of competition and reciprocity. We conducted a laboratory experiment with two treatments to address this issue. In a conventional tournament, an agent receives either the full prize or no prize at all. The other treatment provides the same incentives but the actual payment of an agent equals her expected payment. In both treatments the principal chooses between a low and a high guaranteed payment. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Our results show that inequity between agents’ payoffs and generosity of the principal determines the effectiveness of tournaments. Moreover, the data reveal that agents focus their preferences either on the principal or on the agent.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:contributor>Eisenkopf, Gerald</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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