The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

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EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2013. The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Impac-29929, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests}, year={2013}, number={2013‐06}, author={Eisenkopf, Gerald} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 20.02.2015 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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