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Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany

Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany

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HESSAMI, Zohal, 2014. Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany

@techreport{Hessami2014Appoi-29887, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany}, year={2014}, number={2014-23}, author={Hessami, Zohal} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 19.02.2015 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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