KOPS - The Institutional Repository of the University of Konstanz

Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany

Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany

Cite This

Files in this item

Checksum: MD5:5b401919593202905613c6d43f00a264

HESSAMI, Zohal, 2014. Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany

@techreport{Hessami2014Appoi-29887, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany}, year={2014}, number={2014-23}, author={Hessami, Zohal} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/29887"> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-19T10:29:48Z</dc:date> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29887/3/Hessami_0-276517.pdf"/> <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:creator>Hessami, Zohal</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29887"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/page/termsofuse"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Do incentives and policy choices of public officials depend on whether they are appointed by an elected body or directly elected by voters? I investigate this question using the example of state grants for highly visible municipal investment projects. To attract these grants, mayors must prepare and submit applications to the state government. My identification strategy exploits a natural experiment in a German state where mayor elections were gradually introduced. The difference-in-differences estimation results show that elected mayors attract 7 to 8% more investment grants from the state tier in election years, while for appointed mayors there is no cycle. Results based on hand-collected data for individual mayors exclude alternative transmission channels such as changes in (self-)selection of mayors or partisan alignment in grant allocation.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Hessami, Zohal</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-19T10:29:48Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:title>Appointed Versus Elected Mayors and Incentives to Pork-Barrel : Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Germany</dcterms:title> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29887/3/Hessami_0-276517.pdf"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Downloads since Feb 19, 2015 (Information about access statistics)

Hessami_0-276517.pdf 456

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account