Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition

Cite This

Files in this item

Checksum: MD5:bd91d2dcacb764f2383008d2b1c61b6d

MICEVSKI, Maria, 2013. Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition

@techreport{Micevski2013Recip-29788, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition}, year={2013}, number={2013-25}, author={Micevski, Maria} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/29788"> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-05T12:14:39Z</dc:date> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/page/termsofuse"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:title>Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition</dcterms:title> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29788"/> <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-05T12:14:39Z</dcterms:available> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The presented model demonstrates how the coexistence of reciprocal and selfish types influences the formation of employment relationships, their profitability, wage differentials, wage competition, and unemployment in the presence of moral hazard. Wage and profitability differentials result from the differences in workers’ reactions to the managers’ wage offers. Moreover, these behavioral differences affect managers’ preferences for worker types. Thus, managers might make higher offers to attract the preferred worker type in a competitive labor market with excess supply of labor compared to a situation without competition. The resulting competitive matching allocates favored reciprocal workers to reciprocal managers. Consequently, unemployment arises first among unfavored reciprocal and selfish workers, respectively.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29788/3/Micevski_0-275516.pdf"/> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29788/3/Micevski_0-275516.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Micevski, Maria</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Micevski, Maria</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Downloads since Feb 5, 2015 (Information about access statistics)

Micevski_0-275516.pdf 106

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account