Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition


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MICEVSKI, Maria, 2013. Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition

@techreport{Micevski2013Recip-29788, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition}, year={2013}, number={2013-25}, author={Micevski, Maria} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2015-02-05T12:14:39Z</dc:date> <dcterms:title>Reciprocity, Matching, and Wage Competition</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2015-02-05T12:14:39Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The presented model demonstrates how the coexistence of reciprocal and selfish types influences the formation of employment relationships, their profitability, wage differentials, wage competition, and unemployment in the presence of moral hazard. Wage and profitability differentials result from the differences in workers’ reactions to the managers’ wage offers. Moreover, these behavioral differences affect managers’ preferences for worker types. Thus, managers might make higher offers to attract the preferred worker type in a competitive labor market with excess supply of labor compared to a situation without competition. The resulting competitive matching allocates favored reciprocal workers to reciprocal managers. Consequently, unemployment arises first among unfavored reciprocal and selfish workers, respectively.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:contributor>Micevski, Maria</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Micevski, Maria</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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