Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation

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WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2012. Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation. In: Journal of Theoretical Biology. 315, pp. 128-138. ISSN 0022-5193. eISSN 1095-8541. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.09.012

@article{Wolff2012Retal-29759, title={Retaliation and the role for punishment in the evolution of cooperation}, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.09.012}, volume={315}, issn={0022-5193}, journal={Journal of Theoretical Biology}, pages={128--138}, author={Wolff, Irenaeus} }

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