Type of Publication: | Journal article |
URI (citable link): | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1sfe3mg8tg0tm1 |
Author: | Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon; Teyssier, Sabrina |
Year of publication: | 2014 |
Published in: | Social Choice and Welfare ; 43 (2014), 1. - pp. 195-217. - ISSN 0176-1714. - eISSN 1432-217X |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0763-x |
Summary: |
In many cases individuals benefit differently from the provision of a public good. We study in a laboratory experiment how heterogeneity in returns and uncertainty about the own return affects unconditional and conditional contribution behavior in a linear public goods game. The elicitation of conditional contributions in combination with a within subject design allows us to investigate belief-independent and type-specific reactions to heterogeneity. We find that, on average, heterogeneity in returns decreases unconditional contributions but affects contributions only weakly. Uncertainty in addition to heterogeneity reduces conditional contributions slightly. Individual reactions to heterogeneity differ systematically. Selfish subjects and one third of conditional cooperators do not react to heterogeneity whereas the reactions of the remaining conditional cooperators vary. A substantial part of heterogeneity in reactions can be explained by inequity aversion with respect to different reference groups.
|
Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
Link to License: | In Copyright |
Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
FISCHBACHER, Urs, Simeon SCHUDY, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2014. Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 43(1), pp. 195-217. ISSN 0176-1714. eISSN 1432-217X. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00355-013-0763-x
@article{Fischbacher2014Heter-29723, title={Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods}, year={2014}, doi={10.1007/s00355-013-0763-x}, number={1}, volume={43}, issn={0176-1714}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, pages={195--217}, author={Fischbacher, Urs and Schudy, Simeon and Teyssier, Sabrina} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/29723"> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29723/1/Fischbacher_2-1sfe3mg8tg0tm1.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Schudy, Simeon</dc:contributor> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29723/1/Fischbacher_2-1sfe3mg8tg0tm1.pdf"/> <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Schudy, Simeon</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:contributor>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dcterms:title>Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods</dcterms:title> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-03T10:25:54Z</dcterms:available> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In many cases individuals benefit differently from the provision of a public good. We study in a laboratory experiment how heterogeneity in returns and uncertainty about the own return affects unconditional and conditional contribution behavior in a linear public goods game. The elicitation of conditional contributions in combination with a within subject design allows us to investigate belief-independent and type-specific reactions to heterogeneity. We find that, on average, heterogeneity in returns decreases unconditional contributions but affects contributions only weakly. Uncertainty in addition to heterogeneity reduces conditional contributions slightly. Individual reactions to heterogeneity differ systematically. Selfish subjects and one third of conditional cooperators do not react to heterogeneity whereas the reactions of the remaining conditional cooperators vary. A substantial part of heterogeneity in reactions can be explained by inequity aversion with respect to different reference groups.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-03T10:25:54Z</dc:date> <dc:creator>Fischbacher, Urs</dc:creator> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29723"/> <dc:creator>Teyssier, Sabrina</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Teyssier, Sabrina</dc:contributor> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Fischbacher_2-1sfe3mg8tg0tm1.pdf | 65 |