On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

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NICKLISCH, Andreas, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

@techreport{Nicklisch2012Natur-29702, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={On the Nature of Reciprocity : Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure}, year={2012}, number={2012‐27}, author={Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

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