Optimal Participation Taxes and Efficient Transfer Phase-Out


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LORENZ, Normann, Dominik SACHS, 2012. Optimal Participation Taxes and Efficient Transfer Phase-Out

@techreport{Lorenz2012Optim-29681, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Optimal Participation Taxes and Efficient Transfer Phase-Out}, year={2012}, number={2012‐37}, author={Lorenz, Normann and Sachs, Dominik} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/29681"> <dc:creator>Sachs, Dominik</dc:creator> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:contributor>Lorenz, Normann</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Lorenz, Normann</dc:creator> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29681"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-01-30T10:23:19Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We analyze the optimal design of income transfer programs with a special focus on participation taxes and the marginal tax rates in the phase-out region. The analytical framework incorporates labor supply responses along the intensive and extensive margin, where the latter is due to a minimum hours constraint. All results are expressed in reduced form, i.e. in terms of intensive and extensive labor supply elasticities. We derive a formula for the optimal participation taxes and provide a condition under which negative participation taxes are never part of the optimal tax schedule. Concerning the marginal tax rates in the phase-out region, we develop a test for a tax-transfer system to be beyond the top of the Laffer curve and thus to be (second-best) Pareto inefficient. In such a case there would be room for tax cuts (or increases in transfers) which are self-financing and therefore constitute a Pareto improvement. Applying this test to Germany, our analysis suggests that the structure of marginal tax rates in the transfer phase-out region is (second-best) Pareto inefficient.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:title>Optimal Participation Taxes and Efficient Transfer Phase-Out</dcterms:title> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-01-30T10:23:19Z</dc:date> <dc:contributor>Sachs, Dominik</dc:contributor> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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