Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design

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KRAGL, Jenny, Anja SCHÖTTNER, 2012. Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design

@techreport{Kragl2012Floor-29679, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design}, year={2012}, number={2012‐36}, author={Kragl, Jenny and Schöttner, Anja} }

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