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The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests : Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation

The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests : Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation

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URSPRUNG, Heinrich, 2011. The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests : Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation

@techreport{Ursprung2011Evolu-29573, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests : Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation}, year={2011}, number={2011-02}, author={Ursprung, Heinrich} }

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