Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts


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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374

@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568, title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts}, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019}, number={2}, volume={117}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={405--407}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:contributor>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2014-07-30T06:42:40Z</dc:date> <dc:creator>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Kranz, Sebastian</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Kranz, Sebastian</dc:creator> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Economics Letters ; 117 (2012), 2. - S. 405-407</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2014-07-30T06:42:40Z</dcterms:available> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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