Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts. In: Economics Letters. 117(2), pp. 405-407. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

@article{Goldlucke2012Deleg-28568, title={Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts}, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019}, number={2}, volume={117}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={405--407}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }

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