Type of Publication: | Journal article |
Author: | Goldlücke, Susanne; Kranz, Sebastian |
Year of publication: | 2012 |
Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory ; 147 (2012), 3. - pp. 1191-1221. - ISSN 0022-0531 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008 |
Summary: |
This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.
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JEL Classification: | C73; D82 |
Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
Keywords: | Repeated games, Computational methods, Monetary transfers, Imperfect public monitoring |
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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2012. Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 147(3), pp. 1191-1221. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008
@article{Goldlucke2012Infin-28567, title={Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers}, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.008}, number={3}, volume={147}, issn={0022-0531}, journal={Journal of Economic Theory}, pages={1191--1221}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }
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