Investments as Signals of Outside Options

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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2014. Investments as Signals of Outside Options. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 150, pp. 683-708. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001

@article{Goldlucke2014Inves-28566, title={Investments as Signals of Outside Options}, year={2014}, doi={10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001}, volume={150}, issn={0022-0531}, journal={Journal of Economic Theory}, pages={683--708}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.} }

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