Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality

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OHLENDORF, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2012. Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality. In: International Economic Review. 53(2), pp. 433-452. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354

@article{Ohlendorf2012Repea-28565, title={Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality}, year={2012}, doi={10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00687.x}, number={2}, volume={53}, issn={0020-6598}, journal={International Economic Review}, pages={433--452}, author={Ohlendorf, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/28565"> <dcterms:title>Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Schmitz, Patrick W.</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:contributor>Ohlendorf, Susanne</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Schmitz, Patrick W.</dc:creator> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-08-06T08:11:10Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first-period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified".</dcterms:abstract> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/28565"/> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>International Economic Review ; 53 (2012), 2. - S. 433-452</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-08-06T08:11:10Z</dc:date> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Ohlendorf, Susanne</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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