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Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?

Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?

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Prüfsumme: MD5:d76f011b6db947a518c72815d31e235e

KAAS, Leo, 2004. Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?

@techreport{Kaas2004Finan-28498, series={European Central Bank Working Paper Series;403 / November 2004}, title={Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?}, year={2004}, author={Kaas, Leo}, note={Link zur Originalveröffentlichung:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp403.pdf} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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