When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Prüfsumme: MD5:dfde5f5825b0c6639b520daa3d5093d3

WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2013. When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour

@techreport{Wolff2013bestr-28240, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour}, year={2013}, number={88}, author={Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/28240"> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/28240/2/Wolff_282403.pdf"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:title>When best-replies are not in equilibrium : understanding cooperative behaviour</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/28240"/> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-07-02T07:27:50Z</dc:date> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">To understand cooperative behaviour in social-dilemma experiments, we need to understand the game participants play not only in monetary but in preference terms. Does a Nash-prediction based on participants’ actual preferences describe their behaviour in a public-good experiment well? And if not, where does the observed behaviour diverge from the prediction? This study provides an environment which allows to answer these questions: when making their contribution decision, participants are informed about their co-players’ priorly-elicited conditional-contribution preferences. This induces common knowledge of preferences and thereby leads to direct experimental control over the game participants play. Results show that most people play best-responses to their beliefs. At the same time, beliefs in a third of the cases do not correspond to an equilibrium prediction that is based on the elicited conditional-cooperation preferences. Moreover, more often than not, beliefs are empirically inaccurate. This holds true even in a treatment that gives participants the option to look up the set of equilibria of their game.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2014-07-02T07:27:50Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/28240/2/Wolff_282403.pdf"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

Wolff_282403.pdf 62

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto