Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness

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BALCERAK JACKSON, Brendan, 2013. Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness. In: Erkenntnis. 79(S1), pp. 31-54. ISSN 0165-0106. eISSN 1572-8420. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s10670-013-9444-5

@article{BalcerakJackson2013Verba-26620, title={Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness}, year={2013}, doi={10.1007/s10670-013-9444-5}, number={S1}, volume={79}, issn={0165-0106}, journal={Erkenntnis}, pages={31--54}, author={Balcerak Jackson, Brendan} }

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