An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers

Publikationstyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
Autor/innen: Hahn, Volker
Erscheinungsjahr: 2014
Erschienen in: Economics Letters ; 122 (2014), 2. - S. 132-135. - ISSN 0165-1765
DOI (zitierfähiger Link): https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010
Zusammenfassung:
Drawing on the canonical New Keynesian model, we assess the impact of central bankers’ term duration on governments’ appointment choices. We show that longer terms induce the government to appoint more conservative central bankers, which is socially desirable.
JEL-Klassifikation: E58
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft
Normierte Schlagwörter (GND): Term length, Conservative central banker, New Keynesian model
Universitätsbibliographie: Ja

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HAHN, Volker, 2014. An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers. In: Economics Letters. 122(2), pp. 132-135. ISSN 0165-1765. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010

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