An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers
| Type of Publication: | Journal article |
| Author: | Hahn, Volker |
| Year of publication: | 2014 |
| Published in: | Economics Letters ; 122 (2014), 2. - pp. 132-135. - ISSN 0165-1765 |
| DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010 |
| Summary: |
Drawing on the canonical New Keynesian model, we assess the impact of central bankers’ term duration on governments’ appointment choices. We show that longer terms induce the government to appoint more conservative central bankers, which is socially desirable.
|
| JEL Classification: | E58 |
| Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
| Controlled Keywords (GND): | Term length, Conservative central banker, New Keynesian model |
| Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
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HAHN, Volker, 2014. An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers. In: Economics Letters. 122(2), pp. 132-135. ISSN 0165-1765. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010
@article{Hahn2014argum-25339, title={An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers}, year={2014}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010}, number={2}, volume={122}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={132--135}, author={Hahn, Volker} }
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