An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers

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HAHN, Volker, 2014. An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers. In: Economics Letters. 122(2), pp. 132-135. ISSN 0165-1765. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010

@article{Hahn2014argum-25339, title={An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers}, year={2014}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010}, number={2}, volume={122}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={132--135}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

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