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Tit for Others' Tat : Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment

Tit for Others' Tat : Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment

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BRUTTEL, Lisa, Werner GÜTH, 2013. Tit for Others' Tat : Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment

@techreport{Bruttel2013Other-25329, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Tit for Others' Tat : Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Experiments with Third-Party Monitoring and Indirect Punishment}, year={2013}, number={85}, author={Bruttel, Lisa and Güth, Werner} }

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Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

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