Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility, and Persistence

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HERTWECK, Matthias Sebastian, 2013. Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility, and Persistence. In: The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics. 13(1). ISSN 1935-1690. eISSN 1935-1690. Available under: doi: 10.1515/bejm-2012-0145

@article{Hertweck2013Strat-25182, title={Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility, and Persistence}, year={2013}, doi={10.1515/bejm-2012-0145}, number={1}, volume={13}, issn={1935-1690}, journal={The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics}, author={Hertweck, Matthias Sebastian} }

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