Signaling and Commitment : Monetary versus Inflation Targeting

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GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2006. Signaling and Commitment : Monetary versus Inflation Targeting. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. 10(05). ISSN 1365-1005. eISSN 1469-8056. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S1365100506050255

@article{Gersbach2006Signa-24652, title={Signaling and Commitment : Monetary versus Inflation Targeting}, year={2006}, doi={10.1017/S1365100506050255}, number={05}, volume={10}, issn={1365-1005}, journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics}, author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker} }

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