Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

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GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2007. Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 30(4), pp. 655-683. ISSN 0176-1714. eISSN 1432-217X. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00355-007-0259-7

@article{Gersbach2007Shoul-24649, title={Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?}, year={2007}, doi={10.1007/s00355-007-0259-7}, number={4}, volume={30}, issn={0176-1714}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, pages={655--683}, author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker} }

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