Committees, sequential voting and transparency


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HAHN, Volker, 2008. Committees, sequential voting and transparency. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 56(3), pp. 366-385. ISSN 0165-4896

@article{Hahn2008Commi-24648, title={Committees, sequential voting and transparency}, year={2008}, doi={10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008}, number={3}, volume={56}, issn={0165-4896}, journal={Mathematical Social Sciences}, pages={366--385}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2013-10-08T08:59:44Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:title>Committees, sequential voting and transparency</dcterms:title> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2013-10-08T08:59:44Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.</dcterms:abstract> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Mathematical Social Sciences ; 56 (2008), 3. - S. 366-385</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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