Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Dateien Größe Format Anzeige

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2009. Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union. In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 41(5), pp. 831-853. ISSN 0022-2879. eISSN 1538-4616

@article{Gersbach2009Votin-24644, title={Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union}, year={2009}, doi={10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00235.x}, number={5}, volume={41}, issn={0022-2879}, journal={Journal of Money, Credit and Banking}, pages={831--853}, author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/24644"> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Journal of Money, Credit and Banking ; 41 (2009), 5. - S. 831-853</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-10-04T11:28:52Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/24644"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-10-04T11:28:52Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dcterms:title>Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Gersbach, Hans</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Gersbach, Hans</dc:contributor> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We examine whether the monetary policy committee of a monetary union should publish its voting records when members are appointed by national politicians. We show that the publication of voting records lowers overall welfare. This finding also holds for arbitrary levels of private benefits from holding office and if governments incur costs when replacing committee members. High private benefits of committee members always lower overall welfare, as they induce nonpartisan members to care more about being reappointed than about beneficial policy outcomes. Nonrenewable but long terms for national committee members and delegating the appointment of all committee members to a union-wide authority would be desirable.</dcterms:abstract> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto