Reciprocity and voting

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HAHN, Volker, 2009. Reciprocity and voting. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 67(2), pp. 467-480. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.003

@article{Hahn2009Recip-24641, title={Reciprocity and voting}, year={2009}, doi={10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.003}, number={2}, volume={67}, issn={0899-8256}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, pages={467--480}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

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