Sequential aggregation of verifiable information

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HAHN, Volker, 2011. Sequential aggregation of verifiable information. In: Journal of Public Economics. 95(11-12), pp. 1447-1454. ISSN 0047-2727. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.004

@article{Hahn2011Seque-24633, title={Sequential aggregation of verifiable information}, year={2011}, doi={10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.004}, number={11-12}, volume={95}, issn={0047-2727}, journal={Journal of Public Economics}, pages={1447--1454}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

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