Tax Rules

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GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, Stephan IMHOF, 2012. Tax Rules. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 41(1), pp. 19-42. ISSN 0176-1714. eISSN 1432-217X

@article{Gersbach2012Rules-24627, title={Tax Rules}, year={2012}, doi={10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1}, number={1}, volume={41}, issn={0176-1714}, journal={Social Choice and Welfare}, pages={19--42}, author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker and Imhof, Stephan} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/24627"> <dc:creator>Imhof, Stephan</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Gersbach, Hans</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Imhof, Stephan</dc:contributor> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dcterms:title>Tax Rules</dcterms:title> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-09-25T13:44:26Z</dc:date> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-09-25T13:44:26Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/24627"/> <dc:contributor>Gersbach, Hans</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Social Choice and Welfare ; 41 (2013), 1. - S. 19-42</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Tax schemes are more restricted by constitutional rules than subsidies. We introduce a model of public good provision with incentive problems in agenda-setting and identify several advantages of restrictions on tax schemes. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal and adoption of inefficient projects that benefit only a small minority. We also propose “redistribution efficiency” as a socially desirable property of proposals and find that tax rules guarantee this kind of efficiency. Moreover, a constitution that requires certain restrictions on both taxes and subsidies satisfies a criterion we label “robustness against counter-proposals.” We provide an axiomatic characterization of this constitution. Finally, we perform utilitarian welfare comparisons.</dcterms:abstract> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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