Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment

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BAUERNSCHUSTER, Stefan, Peter DÜRSCH, Jörg OECHSSLER, Radovan VADOVIC, 2010. Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment. In: Journal of Public Economics. 94(11-12), pp. 870-877. ISSN 0047-2727

@article{Bauernschuster2010Manda-23211, title={Mandatory sick pay Provision : A labor market experiment}, year={2010}, doi={10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.009}, number={11-12}, volume={94}, issn={0047-2727}, journal={Journal of Public Economics}, pages={870--877}, author={Bauernschuster, Stefan and Dürsch, Peter and Oechssler, Jörg and Vadovic, Radovan} }

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