A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets : A Comparative Analysis

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JONES, Bryan D., Frank R. BAUMGARTNER, Christian BREUNIG, Christopher WLEZIEN, Stuart SOROKA, Martial FOUCAULT, Abel FRANÇOIS, Christoffer GREEN-PEDERSEN, Chris KOSKI, Peter JOHN, Peter B. MORTENSEN, Frédéric VARONE, Stefaan WALGRAVE, 2009. A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets : A Comparative Analysis. In: American Journal of Political Science. 53(4), pp. 855-873. ISSN 0092-5853. eISSN 1540-5907. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00405.x

@article{Jones2009Gener-23171, title={A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets : A Comparative Analysis}, year={2009}, doi={10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00405.x}, number={4}, volume={53}, issn={0092-5853}, journal={American Journal of Political Science}, pages={855--873}, author={Jones, Bryan D. and Baumgartner, Frank R. and Breunig, Christian and Wlezien, Christopher and Soroka, Stuart and Foucault, Martial and François, Abel and Green-Pedersen, Christoffer and Koski, Chris and John, Peter and Mortensen, Peter B. and Varone, Frédéric and Walgrave, Stefaan} }

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