Inflation Forecast Contracts

Publikationstyp: Working Paper/Technical Report
Autor/innen: Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker
Erscheinungsjahr: 2012
Schriftenreihe: Centre for Economic Policy Research cepr / Discussion paper series;8933
Zusammenfassung:
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare. Optimal inflation forecast contracts stipulate high rewards for accurate forecasts.
JEL-Klassifikation: E58
Fachgebiet (DDC): 330 Wirtschaft
Kommentar zur Publikation: Link zur Originalveröffentlichung: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-11-149.pdf
Universitätsbibliographie: Ja

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GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2012. Inflation Forecast Contracts

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