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Inflation Forecast Contracts

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GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2012. Inflation Forecast Contracts

@techreport{Gersbach2012Infla-21594, series={Centre for Economic Policy Research cepr / Discussion paper series;8933}, title={Inflation Forecast Contracts}, year={2012}, author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker}, note={Link zur Originalveröffentlichung: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-11-149.pdf} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/21594"> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:title>Inflation Forecast Contracts</dcterms:title> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-03-12T09:39:14Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare. Optimal inflation forecast contracts stipulate high rewards for accurate forecasts.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Gersbach, Hans</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/21594"/> <dc:creator>Gersbach, Hans</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-03-12T09:39:14Z</dc:date> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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