Information acquisition and transparency in committees

Cite This

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2011. Information acquisition and transparency in committees. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 41(2), pp. 427-453. ISSN 0020-7276. eISSN 1432-1270. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00182-011-0295-5

@article{Gersbach2011Infor-21591, title={Information acquisition and transparency in committees}, year={2011}, doi={10.1007/s00182-011-0295-5}, number={2}, volume={41}, issn={0020-7276}, journal={International Journal of Game Theory}, pages={427--453}, author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/21591"> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study an intertemporal model of committee decision-making where members differ in their levels of efficiency. They may acquire costly information that enhances their ability to make a correct decision. We focus on the impact of transparency. We show that the principal’s initial utility is higher under transparency, because members exert more effort, which makes correct decisions more likely. The principal also benefits from transparency later, unless transparency leads to an alignment of the signal qualities of highly efficient and less efficient committee members. In general, committee members are harmed by transparency. Together with the insights from the literature, our results may help to decide when transparency in committees is desirable.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>International Journal of Game Theory ; 41 (2012), 2. - S. 427-453</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-02-08T08:34:38Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/page/termsofuse"/> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Gersbach, Hans</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/21591"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-02-08T08:34:38Z</dc:date> <dc:creator>Gersbach, Hans</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:title>Information acquisition and transparency in committees</dcterms:title> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account