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Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?

Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?

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HAHN, Volker, 2011. Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?. In: Oxford Economic Papers. 64(4), pp. 593-615. ISSN 0030-7653. eISSN 1464-3812

@article{Hahn2011Shoul-21590, title={Should central banks remain silent about their private information on cost-push shocks?}, year={2011}, doi={10.1093/oep/gpr056}, number={4}, volume={64}, issn={0030-7653}, journal={Oxford Economic Papers}, pages={593--615}, author={Hahn, Volker} }

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