Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An Experiment

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REISS, J. Philipp, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An Experiment

@techreport{Rei2012Incen-20667, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An Experiment}, year={2012}, number={78}, author={Reiß, J. Philipp and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/20667"> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-10-12T07:10:46Z</dcterms:available> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/20667"/> <dc:contributor>Reiß, J. Philipp</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-10-12T07:10:46Z</dc:date> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We examine the incentive effects of funding contracts on entrepreneurial effort decisions and allocative efficiency. We experiment with funding contracts that differ in the structure of investor repayment and, therefore, in the incentives for entrepreneurial e ffort provision. Theoretically the replacement of a standard debt contract by a repayment-equivalent non-monotonic contract reduces e ort distortions and increases efficiency. Likewise the replacement of outside equity by a repayment-equivalent standard-debt contract mitigates distortions. We test both hypotheses in the laboratory. Our results reveal that the incentive e ffects of funding contracts need to be experienced before they reflect in observed behavior. With sufficient experience observed behavior is consistent with the theoretical predictions and supports both hypotheses. If we allow for entrepreneur-sided manipulations of the project outcome we find that non-monotonic contracts lose its appeal.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:title>Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts : An Experiment</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Reiß, J. Philipp</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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TWI-RPS-078-Reiss-Wolff-2012.pdf 87

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