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The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests : incentives crowd out cooperation

The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests : incentives crowd out cooperation

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URSPRUNG, Heinrich, 2011. The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests : incentives crowd out cooperation. In: Public Choice. 153(1-2), pp. 149-161. ISSN 0048-5829. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9778-y

@article{Ursprung2011evolu-19640, title={The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests : incentives crowd out cooperation}, year={2011}, doi={10.1007/s11127-011-9778-y}, number={1-2}, volume={153}, issn={0048-5829}, journal={Public Choice}, pages={149--161}, author={Ursprung, Heinrich} }

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