Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Dateien Größe Format Anzeige

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

ENGLMAIER, Florian, 2011. Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 32(1), pp. 63-69. ISSN 0143-6570

@article{Englmaier2011Commi-19097, title={Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers}, year={2011}, doi={10.1002/mde.1518}, number={1}, volume={32}, issn={0143-6570}, journal={Managerial and Decision Economics}, pages={63--69}, author={Englmaier, Florian} }

Commitment in R&D tournaments via strategic delegation to overoptimistic managers Publ. in: Managerial and Decision Economics ; 32 (2011), 1. - pp. 63-69 Englmaier, Florian 2012-05-02T08:21:11Z Englmaier, Florian deposit-license This paper shows that it is profitable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain investment strategy in an R&D tournament situation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, all firms delegate to overoptimistic managers, where the optimal degree of overoptimism depends on the riskiness of the tournament. In these situations a manager's type may serve as a substitute for delegation via contracts. By delegating to overoptimistic managers, firms can escape the rat race nature of R&D tournaments. 2011 2012-05-02T08:21:11Z eng

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto