Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Prüfsumme: MD5:be4b90dd5fe82b25a1808a05e41b06a1

HEINRICH, Timo, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note

@techreport{Heinrich2012Strat-18877, series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut}, title={Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note}, year={2012}, number={74}, author={Heinrich, Timo and Wolff, Irenaeus} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/18877"> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Aggregate behavior in two-player hide-and-seek games deviates systematically from the mixed-strategy equilibrium prediction of assigning all actions equal probabilities (Rubinstein and Tversky, 1993, Rubinstein et al., 1996, Rubinstein, 1999). As Crawford and Iriberri (2007) point out, this deviation can be explained by strategic level- k reasoning. Here we provide empirical evidence that, indeed, it is non-equilibrium beliefs that lead to the behavior observed in the earlier studies: when a player's opponent is forced to play the equilibrium strategy, the player's choices are uniformly spread over the action space. At the same time, we nd robust evidence of an unexpected framing e ffect.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-03-30T07:26:44Z</dc:date> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Strategic Reasoning in Hide-and-Seek Games : A Note</dcterms:title> <dc:contributor>Heinrich, Timo</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-03-30T07:26:44Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2012</dcterms:issued> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/18877/1/TWI-RPS-074-Heinrich-Wolff-2012-03.pdf"/> <dc:creator>Heinrich, Timo</dc:creator> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/18877/1/TWI-RPS-074-Heinrich-Wolff-2012-03.pdf"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/18877"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Dateiabrufe seit 01.10.2014 (Informationen über die Zugriffsstatistik)

TWI-RPS-074-Heinrich-Wolff-2012-03.pdf 250

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto