Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market

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FISCHBACHER, Urs, Christian THÖNI, 2008. Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 67(1), pp. 150-163. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018

@article{Fischbacher2008Exces-1860, title={Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market}, year={2008}, doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018}, number={1}, volume={67}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, pages={150--163}, author={Fischbacher, Urs and Thöni, Christian} }

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