Type of Publication: | Journal article |
Author: | Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritzberger, Klaus |
Year of publication: | 2008 |
Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory ; 143 (2008), 1. - pp. 216-250 |
DOI (citable link): | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002 |
Summary: |
This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.
|
JEL Classification: | C72 - Nonc; D70 - Gene |
Subject (DDC): | 330 Economics |
Keywords: | Extensive forms, Trees, Sequential decision theory, Differential games |
Bibliography of Konstanz: | Yes |
Files | Size | Format | View |
---|---|---|---|
There are no files associated with this item. |
ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Klaus RITZBERGER, 2008. Trees and Extensive Forms. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 143(1), pp. 216-250. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002
@article{AlosFerrer2008Trees-1859, title={Trees and Extensive Forms}, year={2008}, doi={10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002}, number={1}, volume={143}, journal={Journal of Economic Theory}, pages={216--250}, author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus} }
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/1859"> <dc:contributor>Ritzberger, Klaus</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dc:creator>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:creator> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Journal of Economic Theory 143 (2008), 1, pp. 216-250</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:12Z</dcterms:available> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:12Z</dc:date> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Ritzberger, Klaus</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:contributor>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:contributor> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:title>Trees and Extensive Forms</dcterms:title> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.</dcterms:abstract> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1859"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>