Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm

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FRIEHE, Tim, 2009. Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm. In: International Review of Law & Economics. 29(2), pp. 161-168. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2008.10.002

@article{Friehe2009Seque-1839, title={Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm}, year={2009}, doi={10.1016/j.irle.2008.10.002}, number={2}, volume={29}, journal={International Review of Law & Economics}, pages={161--168}, author={Friehe, Tim} }

2011-03-23T09:36:08Z Sequential Torts and Bilateral Harm deposit-license 2009 Friehe, Tim Friehe, Tim Publ. in: International Review of Law & Economics 29 (2009), 2, pp. 161-168 This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral. 2011-03-23T09:36:08Z eng

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