Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information

Zitieren

Dateien zu dieser Ressource

Dateien Größe Format Anzeige

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

FRIEHE, Tim, 2009. Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information. In: Journal of Economics. 97(2), pp. 165-183. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y

@article{Friehe2009Escal-1837, title={Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information}, year={2009}, doi={10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y}, number={2}, volume={97}, journal={Journal of Economics}, pages={165--183}, author={Friehe, Tim} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/1837"> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:08Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Publ. in: Journal of Economics 97 (2009), 2, pp. 165-183</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1837"/> <dc:contributor>Friehe, Tim</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:title>Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information</dcterms:title> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103416863-3868037-7"/> <dc:creator>Friehe, Tim</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:08Z</dc:date> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

Das Dokument erscheint in:

KOPS Suche


Stöbern

Mein Benutzerkonto