Debt shifting and ownership structure


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SCHINDLER, Dirk, Guttorm SCHJELDERUP, 2011. Debt shifting and ownership structure

@techreport{Schindler2011shift-18174, series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics}, title={Debt shifting and ownership structure}, year={2011}, number={2011-35}, author={Schindler, Dirk and Schjelderup, Guttorm} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="" xmlns:bibo="" xmlns:dc="" xmlns:dcterms="" xmlns:xsd="" > <rdf:Description rdf:about=""> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource=""/> <dc:language>deu</dc:language> <dc:contributor>Schjelderup, Guttorm</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Debt shifting and ownership structure</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Schindler, Dirk</dc:creator> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="">2012-02-20T14:10:06Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="deu">Previous theoretical studies on the debt shifting behavior of multinationals have assumed affiliates of multinationals to be wholly owned. We develop a model that allows a multinational firm to determine both the leverage and ownership structure in a±liates endogenously. A main finding is that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates and therefore a less tax-efficient financing structure. This is due to an externality that arises endogenously in our model, where costs and benefits of debt shifting are shared asymmetrically between minority and majority owners. Our findings provide a theory framework for recent empirical findings.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Schjelderup, Guttorm</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Schindler, Dirk</dc:contributor> <bibo:uri rdf:resource=""/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="">2012-02-20T14:10:06Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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