KOPS - The Institutional Repository of the University of Konstanz

Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education

Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education

Cite This

Files in this item

Files Size Format View

There are no files associated with this item.

SCHINDLER, Dirk, Benjamin WEIGERT, 2011. Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education

@techreport{Schindler2011Shutt-18172, series={CESifo Working Paper;3436}, title={Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education}, year={2011}, author={Schindler, Dirk and Weigert, Benjamin} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/18172"> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:creator>Schindler, Dirk</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education</dcterms:title> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-02-15T14:12:31Z</dcterms:available> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:contributor>Weigert, Benjamin</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-02-15T14:12:31Z</dc:date> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We analyze whether a redistributive government should provide ex ante insurance against unfortunate outcomes or whether it should instead rely on transfers for redistributing income ex post. To this end, we develop a model of education in which individuals face educational risk and wage dispersion across two types of skills. Successful graduation and working as a skilled worker depends on individual effort in education and on public resources, but educational risk still causes (income) inequality. We show that in a second-best setting, in which learning effort is not observable, improving the quality of education by public funding of the educational sector has a significant effect and that this increases efficiency in comparison to a pure (linear) income tax with income transfers from skilled to unskilled workers. Compared to a first-best solution, providing ex ante insurance significantly gains importance relative to traditional ex post redistribution, because it simultaneously alleviates moral hazard in education. These results are strengthened when a (distortionary) skill-specific tax can be implemented.</dcterms:abstract> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/jspui"/> <dc:creator>Weigert, Benjamin</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Schindler, Dirk</dc:contributor> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/18172"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Search KOPS


Browse

My Account