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Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education

Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education

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SCHINDLER, Dirk, Benjamin WEIGERT, 2011. Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education

@techreport{Schindler2011Shutt-18172, series={CESifo Working Paper;3436}, title={Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education}, year={2011}, author={Schindler, Dirk and Weigert, Benjamin} }

<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/rdf/resource/123456789/18172"> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/18172"/> <dc:creator>Schindler, Dirk</dc:creator> <dcterms:title>Shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted? : on educational risk and the quality of education</dcterms:title> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-02-15T14:12:31Z</dcterms:available> <dc:rights>deposit-license</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Weigert, Benjamin</dc:contributor> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2012-02-15T14:12:31Z</dc:date> <dcterms:issued>2011</dcterms:issued> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We analyze whether a redistributive government should provide ex ante insurance against unfortunate outcomes or whether it should instead rely on transfers for redistributing income ex post. To this end, we develop a model of education in which individuals face educational risk and wage dispersion across two types of skills. Successful graduation and working as a skilled worker depends on individual effort in education and on public resources, but educational risk still causes (income) inequality. We show that in a second-best setting, in which learning effort is not observable, improving the quality of education by public funding of the educational sector has a significant effect and that this increases efficiency in comparison to a pure (linear) income tax with income transfers from skilled to unskilled workers. Compared to a first-best solution, providing ex ante insurance significantly gains importance relative to traditional ex post redistribution, because it simultaneously alleviates moral hazard in education. These results are strengthened when a (distortionary) skill-specific tax can be implemented.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-20140905103605204-4002607-1"/> <dc:creator>Weigert, Benjamin</dc:creator> <dc:contributor>Schindler, Dirk</dc:contributor> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>

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