Hindsight-Biased Evaluation of Political Decision Makers

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SCHUETT, Florian, Alexander K. WAGNER, 2011. Hindsight-Biased Evaluation of Political Decision Makers. In: Journal of Public Economics. Elsevier. 95(11-12), pp. 1621-1634. ISSN 0047-2727. eISSN 1879-2316. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.001

@article{Schuett2011Hinds-1793, title={Hindsight-Biased Evaluation of Political Decision Makers}, year={2011}, doi={10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.001}, number={11-12}, volume={95}, issn={0047-2727}, journal={Journal of Public Economics}, pages={1621--1634}, author={Schuett, Florian and Wagner, Alexander K.} }

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